“Neither democracy nor the rule of law can be based on threats.” – Interview with Dr. Tamás Sulyok in the German political science journal ’Cicero’

Mr. President, do you feel at home in your role as the Hungarian Head of State?

To be President of Hungary, to serve and represent every Hungarian citizen, is a tremendous honour – perhaps the greatest any Hungarian can receive. It is a responsible and undoubtedly very rewarding role, though naturally one that comes with its own challenges.

According to the wishes of the new Hungarian Prime Minister, Péter Magyar, you were expected to announce your resignation by tonight at the latest. Why did you not do so?

Well, let me begin by pointing out that I have sworn to uphold and ensure compliance with the Fundamental Law, as, indeed, have the Prime Minister and the Members of the National Assembly. The Fundamental Law of Hungary sets out the powers of the
President of Hungary in clear terms. The President has no executive power, but rather constitutional duties and competences. The institution of the President is an important balancing element in the system of checks and balances.

The President is a constitutional actor; although he performs his duties within the political sphere, he does so without pursuing his own political agenda in competition with the Government or political parties. His term of office was defined at the time of 
the democratic transition as spanning electoral cycles (five years, whereas the parliamentary term is four years), so that the President can represent and uphold the constitutional framework despite political changes, thereby ensuring that the
country’s governance remains within the bounds of the rule of law.

At the same time, the President of Hungary must cooperate with all constitutional bodies. In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, such as Hungary, such cooperation forms the very foundation for the effective and lawful functioning of the state. It also ensures the balance between the branches of state power, that is, it ensures the system of checks and balances.

The President of Hungary has a constitutional duty, in both foreign and domestic policy, to support the functioning of the Government of the day holding a democratic mandate – provided that the Government remains within the constitutional framework. The Government must be allowed to carry out its activities at its own political responsibility. The President of Hungary may exercise control over the Government solely to prevent an arbitrary exercise of power or the exercise of power in disregard of constitutional constraints.

It is this constitutional role that defines the President of Hungary’s relationship with the Government of the day. On this basis, I clearly conveyed my intention to cooperate to Mr. Péter Magyar during our in-person meeting three days after the elections. At the time, Mr. Magyar reiterated his arguments in favour of my resignation, arguments with which we were already familiar. I replied, in a spirit of mutual respect, that although we did not agree, I would of course take his arguments into due consideration.
However, the Government clearly did not accept our offer of cooperation. At the Inaugural Session of the National Assembly, just minutes after taking the oath to uphold and enforce the Fundamental Law, the Prime Minister, in his inaugural address, called for my resignation in a language that can only be described as personal and difficult to characterise in institutional terms.

However, from the perspective of the stability of Hungary’s constitutional order, it is even more problematic that the Prime Minister has repeatedly and openly suggested that, should I fail to comply with his instruction to step down from office, he will use the power of the two-thirds parliamentary majority resulting from the elections to remove me from my post through legislative means, and even by amending the constitution.  
These open threats violate not only the Constitution but also the fundamental principles of democracy. Neither democracy nor the rule of law can be based on threats.

Despite these threats—and indeed all the more so—I am convinced that, in the absence of any constitutional grounds and in order to preserve the dignity of the office of President of Hungary, there is no justification for my resignation. My oath to the  Fundamental Law entails a duty to uphold the constitutional order.

Why does Péter Magyar maintain that the Head of State would also have been removed in the parliamentary elections on 12 April? Did Hungarian voters go to the polls in April knowing that they were also voting on you as President of Hungary?

This could only have been a campaign ploy, as Péter Magyar – being a lawyer himself – must have known that the Head of State cannot be removed through a parliamentary election. In any case, the arguments he put forward for my removal are, without exception, of a political nature, whereas the office of President of Hungary is a constitutional role. Moreover, the political accusations the Prime Minister levelled at me are one-sided and based on a political misinterpretation of the President’s current constitutional role, and are therefore refutable.

The Hungarian people wanted change; this was obvious and clearly evident from the voter turnout figures; never before have so many people turned out to vote since free elections began. Nor has any opposition party ever won by such a margin. As I said on Election Night at the National Election Office, this was a celebration of democracy. However, democracy does not mean that constitutional and rule-of-law constraints can be overturned.

As one of my esteemed predecessors – who was the first President of the Constitutional Court and thus my predecessor in that role as well – László Sólyom stated: “That is not how a state works.”

Péter Magyar launched a poll on social media asking whether you should remain in office. More than 380,000 of his followers voted in favour of your resignation. Before taking up the office of President, you served as President of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Against that background, how do you assess that people are now voting online on matters concerning state institutions—and at the initiative of the Prime Minister?

Looking at his likes-based poll, it would be more reasonable to ask how the Prime Minister himself assesses the situation in which, out of 3.4 million voters, only around10% expressed their agreement with him in this regard. As for the essence of the 
matter, the Fundamental Law states that the President of Hungary embodies the unity of the Hungarian nation. National unity, however, does not mean embodying only the minority or the majority, but both. This includes those who voted for the Tisza
Party as well as those who did not. The pluralistic Hungarian nation consists of countless social groups and strata. What unites them is the law, which applies equally to everyone. By acting in accordance with the law and its spirit, the Head of State best fulfils his function of embodying the unity of the nation.

Since the office of President of Hungary means a constitutional role, the Head of State cannot be subject to a popularity contest.

Péter Magyar made it clear during the election campaign that you would have to resign if the Tisza Party won the election. He spoke of a “regime change” and claimed that you were Viktor Orbán’s “puppet”. How did you react to Magyar’s statements at the time?

The regime change took place in 1990, when Hungary transitioned from a one-party dictatorship to a pluralistic, participatory democracy. We still live in a democracy today, and I hope no one intends to change that; therefore, at most, we can speak of a change of era or a change of government.

As for the allegation that I am anyone’s puppet, it is simply not true. Even during my time as President of the Constitutional Court, we annulled numerous pieces of legislation passed by a parliament in which Fidesz held a two-thirds majority. As President of Hungary, too, I have exercised my limited veto power against several laws. Moreover, I have never appointed a Fidesz Government, whereas I did appoint a Tisza Government. I have already signed several of their laws and appointed their Ministers and State Secretaries. I am cooperating with them as well  – as I have already explained – in accordance with the law. Does it make me Tisza’s puppet?

I also regard the calls for my resignation as political statements rather than statements under public law that would affect my office. However, I do indeed feel that the respect due to the office of the President of Hungary is lacking.

Have you done anything during your time in office that might have raised doubts about your impartiality? Has Péter Magyar accused you of this?

Even during the campaign, the Prime Minister levelled accusations against me regarding matters which are, on the one hand, political in nature and, on the other, sensitive, and accordingly, one must speak with the appropriate sensitivity about them. In an election campaign, statements of presidents must in any case be much more restrained due to the expectation of impartiality.

Peter Magyar accuses me of failing to speak out regarding a child protection case that caused public outrage in Hungary. This is simply unfounded, as on 11 December 2025 I issued a statement in which I expressed my solidarity with the victims. I pointed out that there is a consensus in Hungary that crimes committed against children are condemned by society and that society considers it necessary to punish the perpetrators severely. I also noted that those working in child protection are bound by strict professional and legal rules, and that proceedings are currently underway in specific cases before the relevant authorities.

Peter Magyar also accused me of remaining silent regarding the tone of the campaign; I can refute this as well, as I issued a statement on this matter in April 2025, addressed to all political participants.

I have also been accused of failing to speak out about any state intelligence surveillance observed during the campaign. The issue of national security is vital to a state’s self-defence mechanisms, and therefore requires a thorough investigation; this investigation, however, is not public, and, according to the Minister of the Interior of the Tisza Government, has not yet been concluded. It would be irresponsible to make a statement as Head of State before its conclusion. Naturally, the standards applicable to statements made by a Head of State differ from those applicable to statements made by a political party during their election campaign.

You also met with Péter Magyar at the swearing-in of the new Government. How did these meetings go? Were they confrontational?

Whenever we met, I always emphasised my willingness to cooperate, while the Prime Minister put forward his arguments in favour of my resignation, arguments with which I disagree. Nevertheless, we do not have to agree on everything in order to work together, though the Prime Minister may not see it that way.

Photographs were taken during the swearing-in ceremony – which is entirely customary on such occasions. Is it true that Mr. Magyar’s side took care to ensure that you were not visible in the photographs? And that you were subsequently cropped out from a group photo?

Everyone knew—since the Prime Minister had made it public—that he had requested that the customary group photographs not be taken on this occasion. However, the Prime Minister was also aware that my photography team would be present and working at the event. Several media outlets raised concerns about the photo-editing solution you are referring to, which is unusual from an independent public media organisation. The situation led to an internal investigation, and the media organisation subsequently accepted responsibility.

You have decided to remain in office – contrary to the Prime Minister’s express wishes. What does this mean specifically for the future course of political events in Hungary? Are blockades of any kind possible?

From the perspective of the functioning of the constitutional order, my remaining in office ensures legal continuity to uphold the system of checks and balances. This is also one of the conditions for political stability and, as I explained earlier, entails continued cooperation with the Government.  
Under the Hungarian Constitution, the Head of State may only be removed from office if he has committed a criminal offence or acted unlawfully in the exercise of his office. I assume that this has not been and will not be the case with you. Do you have any idea what course of action Péter Magyar might take to remove you from office after all?

The Government has not yet disclosed any specific details of its plans in this regard. However, the Prime Minister has made it clear on several occasions that his aim is to remove the President of Hungary and other public officials independent of the Government from office before their terms expire. There may be a hidden agenda of ‘constitution-making’, paving the way for person-specific legislation. This would amount to political patronage.

Magyar’s Tisza Party holds a two-thirds majority in parliament – and thanks to this, it could amend the constitution at any time. It is conceivable, for example, that the direct election of the President by the Hungarian people in future could be enshrined in the constitution. But even if this were to happen, and a new Head of State were soon to be elected directly, you would remain in office, as your term of office is due to run until 2029. Could Péter Magyar claim a constitutional crisis?

At present, a clear political will appears to be emerging in Hungary to redefine the role of the President of Hungary. Although the current constitutional arrangement has a historical tradition in Hungary, a constituent majority in parliament could change this.
It is, however, very important that such a process be carried out after proper preparation. As the Minister for Justice also emphasised during her parliamentary hearing, they wish to conduct a wide-ranging professional debate on constitutional issues and intend to proceed in line with the rule of law and European values. I naturally assume that this will be the case.

If, for example, the President of Hungary were to be directly elected and were also granted executive powers, this would fundamentally alter the constitutional status of the Head of State. In this case, executive power would partly pass to the President of Hungary, whereas under the current Hungarian system, the Head of State is not part of the executive branch.

However, as we are not familar with the specific proposals and have only heard of general directions, I am not in a position to articulate a clear opinion.

In my view, the term of office laid down in the Constitution and the completion of that term cannot cause a constitutional crisis.
Is it conceivable, or indeed possible at all, that there could suddenly be two Heads of State: yourself and a person directly elected by the people?

No, I do not see any realistic possibility of this. 

Previous governments led by Viktor Orbán were regularly accused of using their two-thirds parliamentary majority to reshape Hungary’s institutional system in a way that favoured the Fidesz party. Now there is a perception emerging that Péter Magyar and his Tisza party may be acting in a similar manner. Is Magyar putting the reputation of the rule of law in Hungary at risk?

The Minister of Justice has publicly committed to ensuring that solutions affecting the constitutional system are devised in accordance with the rule of law, European and international constitutional standards.

If the Government initiates legislation or a constitutional amendment, it must do so while respecting the norms of the rule of law and European values. It is important to note that, according to European constitutional standards, even the appearance that a specific legislative process has the explicit or implicit aim of removing an elected public official from office must be avoided. It is important to emphasise that even the appearance of measures not in line with the rule of law would be detrimental to Hungary’s reputation.

Have the EU institutions, which have always been critical of Viktor Orbán, already commented on the current case?

I am not aware of any comments from them.

Have you yourself noticed any reactions from abroad since the conflict with Péter Magyar?

I can see that international public opinion is, for the time being, watching to see what happens. Several voices in the German, Austrian and Swiss media have already expressed their concerns regarding the Prime Minister’s statements aimed at removing the President of Hungary and other public dignitaries from office.

Does Magyar’s Tisza Party and the new Members of the Government truly unanimously support the Prime Minister’s intention to remove you from office?

I cannot see what the level of unity is within the Government on this issue. In any case, since the Head of Government has clearly stated this intention, we must regard it as the official position.

In his interview on 25 May, the Prime Minister stated that my removal is necessary because he fears, and I quote: “we have a President of Hungary who may raise constitutional objections,” and thereby “delay” the legislative procedures – which the Prime Minister considers urgent - necessary for the disbursement of EU funds.

It is the Hungarian President’s power, enshrined in the Fundamental Law, to refer laws he deems unconstitutional to the Constitutional Court for prior review before their promulgation.

The Prime Minister has stated that he wishes to remove me from office out of concern that I will fulfil my constitutional duty and exercise the powers of my position. In other words, the Prime Minister fears that I will exercise constitutional oversight over the legislature as required by my role. He therefore seeks to remove me precisely because I am performing my constitutional functions and, in doing so, he wishes to weaken the system of checks and balances that my office represents, thereby also obstructing the proper functioning of the judiciary. 

It is worrying if the Government regards constitutional principles and fundamental rights not as yardsticks, but as obstacles to be removed from the legislative process. Compliance with EU rule of law requirements cannot be achieved through measures that themselves conflict with those standards. If the legislation required for the disbursement of EU funds is not adopted in line with rule-of-law guarantees, this would constitute a serious risk to Hungary’s ability to access these funds. 

I would like to make it clear that, provided the new government does not pursue policies that violate fundamental constitutional principles or restrict fundamental rights, there is no reason for it to fear that I will obstruct legislation that is backed by a democratic mandate.

(The original German version of the interview can be found HERE.)